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A futures contract is an agreement to buy or sell an asset at a future date at a price 
agreed upon today. The Kuala Lumpur Interbank Offered Rate (“KLIBOR”) futures 
or known as FKB3 is the interest rate futures contract available in Malaysia. This 
study examines the availability of arbitrage opportunities after accounting for 
transaction costs for interest rate futures contract. Fair value of the KLIBOR futures 
price is calculated using Implied Forward Rate and is compared to the actual price to 
determine the arbitrage opportunities from 1996 to 2003. The pricing of the KLIBOR 
futures contract is said to be efficient when the mispricing between fair value and 
actual value is small, if not zero. When mispricing is small, the benefit will spill over 
to the hedgers, whereby they can make a more effective hedging decision. The 
findings show that mispricing is small for contracts near to maturity and it increases 
as the contracts move further from maturity. This suggests that arbitrage 
opportunities are available to be exploited for contracts furthest from maturity. It also 
suggests that hedging decision can be made effectively if one trades in contracts near 
to maturity. More concerted efforts should be in place to encourage domestic and 
foreign retailers as well as foreign institutions to trade in KLIBOR futures contract. 
 iii 
To provide liquidity in the interest rate futures market, Market Makers’ Scheme 
should be reintroduced. The finding also shows that the difference is narrowing 
between the actual price and the fair price of interest rate futures contracts as a 
function of time to maturity.  
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Kontrak niagaan hadapan adalah perjanjian di antara pembeli dengan penjual ke atas 
sesuatu aset pada harga yang ditetapkan untuk urusniaga yang akan berlaku pada 
masa hadapan yang telah ditetapkan, seperti mana yang terkandung dalam perjanjian. 
Kontrak niagaan hadapan Kadar Tawaran Antarabangsa Bank Kuala Lumpur adalah 
salah satu daripada kontrak niagaan hadapan yang terdapat di Malaysia. Kajian ini 
meninjau peluang kepada pelabur untuk meraih keuntungan di dalam kontrak 
niagaan hadapan Kadar Tawaran Antarabangsa Bank Kuala Lumpur tiga bulan, 
selepas mengambil kira kos urusniaga yang terlibat. Untuk ini, harga yang sepatutnya 
dinilai untuk kontrak ini ditentukan dengan menggunakan kaedah “Implied Forward 
Rate” dari tahun 1996 sehingga 2003. Harga ini kemudiannya dibandingkan dengan 
harga kontrak niagaan hadapan Kadar Tawaran Antarabangsa Bank Kuala Lumpur 
tiga bulan yang berada di pasaran. Perbezaan di antara kedua-dua harga adalah salah 
harga kontrak. Kontrak niagaan hadapan Kadar Tawaran Antarabangsa Bank Kuala 
Lumpur tiga bulan dikatakan efisyen sekiranya salah harga kontrak adalah kecil. 
Sekiranya mekanisme harga untuk kontrak niagaan hadapan Kadar Tawaran 
Antarabangsa Bank Kuala Lumpur tiga bulan efisyen, pelabur yang ingin menyekat 
 v 
kerugian daripada kenaikan atau penurunan kadar faedah juga akan merasa 
keberkesanannya. Penemuan daripada kajian ini menunjukan bahawa salah harga 
kontrak adalah kecil bagi kontrak-kontrak yang mempunyai tarikh matang yang 
singkat. Walaubagaimanapun, bagi kontrak-kontrak yang mempunyai tarikh matang 
yang panjang, salah harga meningkat tinggi. Ini menunjukan bahawa peluang untuk 
meraih keuntungan wujud dalam kontrak-kontrak yang mempunyai tarikh matang 
yang panjang dan aktiviti pembetulan atau dikenali sebagai abitraj diperlukan untuk 
menyatukan harga pasaran dengan harga yang sepatutnya ke titik keseimbangan. 
Usaha diperlukan untuk menggalakkan penglibatan pelabur runcit di dalam dan juga 
di luar negara serta institusi-institusi asing di dalam kontrak niagaan hadapan Kadar 
Tawaran Antarabangsa Bank Kuala Lumpur. Selain itu, untuk memastikan kecairan 
dalam kontrak niagaan hadapan Kadar Tawaran Antarabangsa Bank Kuala Lumpur 
tiga bulan ini, “Skim Market-Makers” harus diperkenalkan semula. Penemuan kajian 
ini juga menunjukkan bahawa salah harga di antara harga pasaran dengan harga yang 
sepatutnya berkurangan menjelang tarikh matang kontrak. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Individual investors, financial and corporate institutions invest in financial assets, 
with a hope of earning a positive rate of returns on the investments. However, not all 
investments will yield a positive rate of returns, as there are factors that hinder an 
investment from earning a positive rate of return. For instance, unexpected interest 
rate movements and inflation make the future earnings uncertain. Risk exists when 
investment is made. Risk can be defined as any source of randomness that may have 
an adverse impact on a person or corporation’s future earning.
1
 In finance theory, a 
security’s total risk is made up of two components, which are systematic risk and 
unsystematic risk. The systematic risk of a security is that part of the total risk that is 
associated with movements in the underlying market as a whole. It is also known as 
unavoidable risk, market risk or non-diversifiable risk, since no amount of 
diversification can reduce it. It is usually measured in terms of beta. Beta is an 
indicator, which measures an investment’s volatility of return, relative to the market 
return. It measures the relationship between the rises and falls in the overall market 
and the performance of the individual share or portfolio. Unsystematic risk, which is 
also known as specific, diversifiable, avoidable risk, on the other hand is specific to 
particular institution or an industry. One form of unsystematic risk is financial risk.  
 
                                                           
1 C.L. Culp, The Risk Management Process; Business Strategy and Tactics, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 
2001, Page 14. 
 2 
The ways and means by which an institution finances their activity constitutes 
financial risk. The degree of financial risk can be inferred from the capital structure 
of the institution. The amount of debt or borrowed capital in the financial structure 
signifies interest payment by the institution to the debt holders or preference 
shareholders. As a result, the balance of earning for equity shareholders varies 
depending on the interest and principal payments. Financial risk can be avoided as 
the management has the discretion to borrow money or otherwise. Financial risk is 
very much associated with interest rates movements.  
 
An adverse interest rate movement will affect the value of investment portfolio and 
also the cost of doing business. For instance, if interest rate rises, bond prices will 
decline resulting in a capital loss. This risk exists because new bonds are likely to be 
issued with higher yields as interest rates increase, making the old or outstanding 
bonds less attractive. Hence, the longer the bond’s maturity, the greater the impact of 
a change of interest rate will have on its price. In terms of cost of doing business, 
when interest rate increases, it will have a direct impact on the lending rates. 
Financial and corporate institutions usually borrow money to run its daily operations. 
Increase in interest rate has a domino effect. When lending rate is increased, it will 
cause a higher cost of borrowing which will eventually increase the cost of 
production. A higher cost of production will affect the final price of the goods and 
services produced, of which is passed on to the consumers.  
 
By all means, it is possible for financial and corporate institutions to manage the 
interest rate fluctuations. One of the ways to manage interest rate risk that has gain 
popularity in recent years is through hedging via futures contracts. A futures contract 
 3 
is an agreement to buy or sell an asset at a future date at a price agreed upon today. 
By definition, hedging is the act of transferring risk to the other party in view of 
changes in interest rates that will have an adverse impact on the investment in the 
cash market. 
 
Interest rate futures contracts can be used by borrowers to hedge the cost in the event 
of rising interest rate while when interest rate falls, lenders can hedge to protect their 
revenue. For instance, a fund manager expects to receive an amount of money in 
three months’ time. The fund manager anticipates the interest rate to fall by the time 
the money is invested. To protect the investment against the fall in interest rate, the 
manager can buy the interest rate futures contracts that will mature at the time the 
money is invested in cash market. Since the price of interest rate futures contracts is 
inversely related to the interest rates, the fund manager should buy the futures 
contracts, as it is cheaper now and sell it later at a higher price. This strategy will 
generate profits from futures contracts transaction that will offset the decline in cash 
market investment due to interest rate fall.  
 
Likewise, the contract can also be used to hedge the cost in the event of rising 
interest rate. Supposed, a corporate or financial institution treasury wants to borrow 
money in three months’ time and anticipate that the interest rate will increase by the 
time the money is borrowed.  To hedge against the interest rate increase, the treasurer 
can sell the interest rate futures contracts that will mature at the time the money is 
borrowed in cash market. Since the price of interest rate futures contracts is inversely 
related to the interest rates, the treasury should sell the futures contracts, as the price 
is higher now and complete the transaction by buying it later.  
 4 
 
While much has been said about interest rate futures as a hedging tool, the ability to 
hedge interest rate risk effectively lies in the pricing of the interest rate futures itself. 
The pricing mechanism of the of the interest rate futures contract has to be efficient 
in such a way that discrepancies of prices between the cash market and futures 
market is minimal. This is where arbitraging activities are important. By definition, 
arbitraging is the process of simultaneous buying and selling an instrument in 
different markets to earn risk-free profits. In this instance, arbitrage transaction is 
initiated when there are discrepancies of prices between the cash market and the 
interest rate futures market. When there is misalignment between underlying cash 
price and interest rate futures price, arbitrageurs will enter the market to ensure that 
interest rate futures contracts are traded at its fair price. Only when arbitrage trading 
is active, the objective of efficient contract pricing can be met. This is because an 
active arbitrage trading will ensure that interest rate futures contracts are fairly priced. 
Fair price is the price that futures contracts should theoretically be traded. As 
arbitrageurs constantly believe that the fair price is the true price, they will trade 
based on trading strategies, thus forcing the market price to be aligned with the fair 
price. At this point, equilibrium price is reached and the contracts are fairly priced. 
However, if arbitrage trading is insignificant, interest rate futures price could deviate 
significantly from its fair price, causing hedgers to avoid using interest rate futures 
market because of poor hedging results. Chapter 2 discusses the concept of arbitrage 
in detail.  
 
 
 
 5 
1.2 Overview of Interest Rate Futures Market in Malaysia 
 
In Malaysia, interest rate futures contract is known as Kuala Lumpur Interbank 
Offered Rate (“KLIBOR”) futures. . This contract began its operation on Malaysian 
Monetary Exchange (“MME”) in 1996. Today, it is under Bursa Malaysia 
Derivatives Sdn Bhd’s purview. Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Sdn Bhd’s was formerly 
known as Malaysian Derivatives Exchange (“MDEX”), the exchange that is 
responsible for the futures market development. 
 
The Contract represents a Ringgit interbank deposit in Kuala Lumpur Wholesale 
Money Market with a principle value of Ringgit Malaysia one million (RM 
1,000,000) with a three-month tenor. The underlying asset is the three-month 
Ringgit interbank money market deposit. The three-month Ringgit interbank money 
market deposit is explained at the end of this section. There are several reasons why 
three-month tenor is chosen instead of other tenors available in the interbank market. 
First of all, the underlying cash market, which is the three-month KLIBOR, is the 
most liquid in the interbank market. Apart from that, the three-month KLIBOR are 
also being used as a benchmark in pricing of money market instruments such as 
Bankers Acceptance. Finally, other successful international futures market such as 
Hong Kong Futures Exchange (“HKFE”) and Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
(“CME”) also use three-month tenor interest rate that is HIBOR and LIBOR, 
respectively. 
 
KLIBOR futures contract work differently from any other futures contract in such a 
way that the borrowing or lending starts on the day the contract matures. For instance, 
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when an investor long a KLIBOR futures contract, it means that the investor invests 
RM 1,000,000 million for a period of 3 months starting from the maturity day of the 
contract at the futures yield rate. On the other hand, when an investor short a 
KLIBOR futures contract, it means that the investor borrows RM 1,000,000 million 
for a period of 3 months starting from the maturity day of the contract at the futures 
yield rate.  
 
The months that are available for the contract to be traded are the quarterly cycle 
months of March, June, September and December up to 5 years forward and 2 serial 
months. The tick size in percent is equivalent to one basis point. One basis point is 
hundredth of one percent. Thus 0.01% (1 tick) is equivalent to RM25.00 (RM 
1,000,000 x 3/12 x 0.01%) per contract. This tick represents the minimum price 
fluctuation, which is the smallest price increase or decrease in trading a given 
contract. 
 
KLIBOR futures contract is priced in terms of an index that is 100 minus interest rate. 
This implies that there is an inverse relationship between futures price and interest 
rates. Thus, if an investor foresees that interest rate will increase tomorrow, the 
investor should sell the futures today. This is because a rise in interest rate will lead 
to a drop in futures price. The reverse strategy should be taken if the investor 
foresees that the interest rate is to decrease the next day. 
 
The KLIBOR futures contracts expire on the third Wednesday of the contract month. 
It is cash settled, that is there is no delivery of a cash instrument upon maturity 
because the Three-Month Ringgit Interbank Deposit is not transferable. 
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Fair value of the KLIBOR futures price is calculated using Implied Forward Rate 
(“IFR”). This implies that the futures price does not reflect the current KLIBOR, but 
instead, the rate that is expected to prevail when the contract matures. IFR technique 
incorporates the KLIBOR from different tenors in order to determine the KLIBOR 
futures price.  
 
When the KLIBOR futures first started its trading in mid 1996, it had a promising 
start. The market recorded turnover of 38,342 contracts for the second half-year of 
1996. In terms of average daily turnover, it accounted for 256 contracts. In 1997, the 
trading volume continued to increase. The average daily turnover was 307 contracts. 
In July 1997, the monthly turnover reached to 13,893 contracts, the highest monthly 
turnover since its trading in mid 1996. The turnover increased tremendously due to 
sharp increase in interest rate following speculative pressures on the ringgit as a 
result of the financial crisis contagion effects. As a result, the financial institutions 
hedged their portfolios, which led to an increased turnover of the KLIBOR futures 
contracts. Furthermore, the volatility in the interbank market has created 
opportunities for the market players to arbitrage between the cash and futures market. 
For example, on May 16, 1997 the KLIBOR futures rate stood at 7.50% while the 
underlying rate was 8.76%. This provides an opportunity to arbitrage due to 
discrepancy of rate between cash and futures market.  However, in December the 
monthly turnover dropped to 1,196 contracts. The low turnover in the last quarter of 
1997 was partly due to the distortion and fragmentation in the KLIBOR futures 
market and its underlying cash market. For instance, on December 30, 1997 the 
KLIBOR futures rate was 9.40% while the underlying cash market stood at 9.07%. 
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This has resulted in increase in basis risk, which is the risk of not being able to fully 
hedge the price risk, and caused hedging more costly.  
 
Trading volume plummeted further in 1998, in October especially following the 
implementation of the selective exchange controls in September 1998. Although the 
trading in Commodity and Monetary Exchange of Malaysia (“COMMEX”)2 was 
exempted from the 12-Month Rule
3
 on the repatriation of capital, foreign interest was 
reduced. The evidence can be seen for the decrease in the average share of foreign 
participation of the total turnover. The average share of foreign participation of the 
total turnover was 23% between August and September 1998 while between October 
and December 1998, it was only 4.3%. In addition, the banking institutions, which 
form the largest players in the market, were engaged in managing the non-
performing loans and loan recovery rather than participating in the futures market.  
 
In 1999, KLIBOR futures contracts were more actively traded. The average daily 
turnover was 115 contracts compared to 102 contracts in 1998. One of the factors 
that lead to higher trading activities was the revival of the Market-Makers’ Scheme 
in August 1999. Market-Makers’ Scheme was initiated in 1996 to provide liquidity to 
the futures market as liquidity is essential in securing the success of the futures 
contracts. Under this scheme, ten financial institutions were accepted by MME as 
market-makers in order to achieve and maintain a reasonable level of liquidity of the 
                                                           
2 COMMEX was formed through the merger of Kuala Lumpur Commodity Exchange (“KLCE”) and 
MME on 7 December 1998 as a multi-product Futures Exchange in the country.  In 2001, COMMEX 
and Kuala Lumpur Options and Financial Futures Exchange Berhad (“KLOFFE”) merged to form 
MDEX. 
3 A "12-month rule" was imposed in September 1998 prohibiting the repatriation of portfolio funds for 
12 months following the Asian Financial Crisis. This "12 month rule" was necessary given the 
prevailing instability of the financial market. There was the possibility that the bad publicity following 
Malaysia's `unorthodox' measures could result in massive short- term capital outflows. Therefore, a 
12- month restriction was considered necessary. 
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KLIBOR futures contracts. This involved the obligation to trade a minimum amount 
of 35 lots per day and to quote two-way prices for the first four contract months. In 
return, market-makers will be compensated in terms of lower commission fees, 
waiver on the exchange levy and concessions to trade. However, in July 1998, this 
scheme was terminated as a result of financial crisis. On August 16, 1999, this 
scheme was re-introduced. The re-introduction of Market-Makers’ Scheme led to an 
increased in the turnover. The bulk of the turnover was contributed by the market-
makers, which is 49% – 69 % of total turnover in the last four month of 1999. Also, 
decline in 3- month KLIBOR from 6.52% in January 1999 to 4% in April 1999 could 
have contributed to a higher turnover, as the market players demand the contracts for 
hedging against interest rate movements. Turnover in April was the highest during 
the year, with average daily turnover of 211 contracts. 
 
From year 2000 to 2003, the annual turnover for KLIBOR futures contracts showed 
an improvement in terms of higher turnover volume. This was due to the hedging 
activities by the market players in view of changes in interest rate expectations.  
 
1.2.1 The Underlying Instrument: Three-Month Ringgit Interbank Deposit 
 
Generally, financial institutions will deal directly among themselves in providing 
short-term lending as well as short-term borrowing without intervention from central 
bank, Bank Negara Malaysia (“BNM”), in a place called interbank market. The 
placement of money by an approved interbank institution with another approved 
institution is known as Ringgit Interbank Deposits. The principal would be repaid 
with interest quoted in percent per annum on the maturity date of the deposit. This 
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interbank market, among other things, acts as a reliable and convenient channel for 
financial institutions to meet their wide deposit base to fund their loans as well as to 
meet the statutory reserve and minimum liquidity requirements of BNM. 
 
As defined by the BNM, 3-month ringgit interbank deposit is: 
i. A placement of money by an approved interbank institution with another 
interbank institution on terms that the principal would be repaid with interest 
quoted in percent per annum on the maturity date of the deposit. 
ii. The market in ringgit interbank deposits is a wholesale time deposit market 
with the following features: 
a) Only approved interbank institutions are involved 
b) A money broker may act as intermediary or arranger of the transaction 
c) The transaction amount is large, typically at the standard amount of 
RM 5 million, and in any case not less than RM 50,000 
d) Tenors which are fixed at the time of dealing range from overnight to 
5 years 
e) No deposit of certificate or book is issued, and no collateral would be 
pledged as security 
f) Documentation is in terms of written RENTAS, the real-time, gross-
transfer electronic system confirmation 
g) Oral agreements by the dealing principals done through the telephone 
are deemed binding and irrevocable 
 
KLIBOR is the interest rate charged (or received) on short-term funds placed in the 
interbank market. It is an offer rate at which participants in the interbank market are 
